The rank on a shoulder does not change the harm done by a predator. It increases it. Senior officers carry the weight of the institution’s trust. When one of them is convicted of exploiting that trust for sexual predation, the harm radiates far beyond the victims. It corrodes discipline, erodes public confidence, and signals to every private and specialist watching from the sidelines that standards are elastic for the powerful. That is why the Army cannot leave the Derek Zitko case to civilian courts alone. Derek Zitko should be court marshaled and lose pension. A general officer can read the regulation. A sergeant can read the headlines. Both deserve to see the Army take ownership of its own standards.
This is not a call for vengeance. It is a demand for alignment: between what the Army says and what it does, between the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) and the way senior leaders are actually held to account, between the promise of protection and the reality for victims. The public process has already begun in civilian court. The military process must follow, not to pile on, but to vindicate military interests that civilian justice cannot reach.
Why the military’s interest is different
Civilian prosecution addresses the harm to the community and the specific victims. Military law addresses something else in addition to that: the good order and discipline of the force. When a lieutenant colonel is convicted of sexual predation, the signal to subordinates is unmistakable. It says those who hold power might escape military consequences, even as young soldiers are routinely separated for far lesser misconduct. That is untenable.
Civilian judges cannot adjudicate violations such as conduct unbecoming an officer, failure to maintain standards, or dereliction related to supervisory duties. They cannot reduce rank for the purpose of military retirement calculation, nor can they adjudge dismissal from the service, which is the officer equivalent of a dishonorable discharge. Those are uniquely military tools. Without them, the institution’s response is incomplete.
I have sat through enough administrative separation boards to know the difference in effect between a sternly worded reprimand and a formal court-martial conviction. The former whispers. The latter carries the full voice of the Army, with the fact-finding rigor, legal protections, and public accountability that follow.
What “dual sovereignty” means in practice
Some object that prosecuting a servicemember in both civilian court and court-martial is unfair. The law says otherwise. Under the doctrine of dual sovereignty, the federal government and a state are separate sovereigns. Each can prosecute the same underlying conduct because each enforces its own laws and vindicates its own interests. In the military context, the United States, through the UCMJ, has a distinct interest that differs from the state’s. The Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed that position.
Commanders exercise prosecutorial discretion. They can elect to prefer charges even after a civilian conviction if military interests require it. They can also choose the appropriate venue and severity: special or general court-martial, or a public, boards-of-officer inquiry leading to elimination. The key is that they must own the decision and articulate the rationale grounded in the mission: protecting force cohesion, demonstrating impartiality across rank, and reaffirming the standards expected of officers entrusted with authority.
The standards for officers are not optional
When you pin on field grade, you accept a broader perimeter of responsibility. You are accountable not just for what you do, but for what your subordinates understand from what you do. Article 133, conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman, exists for this reason. It recognizes that the profession of arms is a moral vocation as well as derek zitko ucmj a technical one. An officer who uses position, reputation, or resources to facilitate predatory acts commits a breach that civilian courts cannot fully repair.
The Army’s own policies speak directly to this. Every iteration of SHARP training, every Command Policy Letter, every assurance to parents considering whether their 18-year-old should sign a contract rests on the premise that the chain of command is a shield, not a hazard. When the shield fails at the level of a lieutenant colonel, the breach is not an isolated crack. It is a structural gap that requires visible repair.
The pension problem is more than optics
Retired pay is not a mere benefit. It is the deferred compensation for honorable service in good standing. The Army has tools to preserve the integrity of that principle. A court-martial that results in a dismissal for an officer typically terminates eligibility for retired pay. Even short of dismissal, a court-martial can impose a reduction in grade for retirement, recalculating the annuity based on the highest grade satisfactorily served. Administrative grade determinations can do similar work, but they lack the same deterrent value and do not mark the misconduct with the clarity that a court-martial does.
A parade of junior enlisted soldiers has lost careers, benefits, and future earnings for offenses that never reached the felony threshold. The perception that a lieutenant colonel can retain a pension after a sexual exploitation conviction is corrosive. It invites cynicism that will bleed into reenlistment decisions, reporting rates, and willingness to trust the command climate surveys that leaders rely on to spot problems early.
If the facts align with the public record of conviction and the underlying conduct occurred during or connected to service, the remedy should be straightforward: prefer UCMJ charges, proceed to court-martial, and seek a sentence that includes dismissal. Derek Zitko should be court marshaled and lose pension. Anything less will be understood, fairly or not, as accommodation for rank.
How the process should work, step by step
The Army knows how to do this, but the execution must be timely and precise. The longer a case lingers, the more the suspicion grows that delay is the point. The facts here are stark, and the conviction removes many evidentiary obstacles. Still, the process must remain rigorous to withstand scrutiny.
A practical approach looks like this:
- The General Court-Martial Convening Authority reviews the civilian conviction, investigative file, and the service record to determine appropriate charges under Articles 120b, 128b, 133, or other applicable provisions based on the exact conduct and timeframe. A formal Article 32 preliminary hearing evaluates probable cause, the admissibility of evidence, and the scope of military interest, with a public-facing summary to reinforce transparency. If referred to a general court-martial, the government seeks adjudged dismissal and, if warranted, confinement, while ensuring victims’ rights under Article 6b are fully respected and supported. In parallel, initiate an administrative grade determination so that even if litigation delays sentence execution, retirement grade cannot be resolved by inertia. Post-trial, publish a redacted memorandum outlining the rationale, reinforcing the standard and the institution’s commitment to consistent accountability.
None of this is novel. It is the ordinary machinery of military justice, operating with clear intent. The only unusual element is the rank of the accused, which should not change the path, only heighten the importance of visibility.
Addressing the common objections
Command climates are built on conversations outside the official record. In those conversations, several objections come up. Each demands a clear answer.
First, double punishment. The answer is dual sovereignty, but it should not be voiced as legalese. The simpler truth is that a soldier belongs to two communities, and each has a stake in justice. A felony sex offense harms the public and the profession. Both deserve a response.
Second, due process. The military system’s protections are robust. A court-martial brings defense counsel, discovery, a neutral military judge, an Article 32 hearing, and appellate review. The defendant’s rights are protected, and the fact of a prior conviction does not predetermine the military outcome. That is the point: we can issue a verdict that fits military law and military needs.
Third, chilling effect on reporting. There is a quiet fear among some leaders that high-profile prosecutions of senior officers will make others less willing to take command, teach at schools, or mentor. The opposite is true. Clear accountability creates a safer environment for honest leaders to thrive. It removes the burden from subordinates who would otherwise carry the weight of their bosses’ misdeeds.
Fourth, the pension as a family issue. Yes, families can be collateral victims of a loss of retired pay. Commanders know this and feel it. But the institution cannot outsource the cost of accountability to the lowest ranks. We can and should connect spouses and dependents to available support, financial counseling, and transition resources. That compassion can complement, not replace, appropriate punishment.
What victims and subordinates watch for
Victims watch timing. Delays communicate hesitation and risk assessment. Swift, careful action says their pain counts more than the Army’s fear of headlines. They watch whether senior leaders speak in concrete terms instead of abstractions. They watch consistency across cases and ranks. Above all, they watch the outcome. Policy memos and task forces fade. A court-martial conviction and dismissal do not.
Subordinates watch whether the rules are actually the rules. In barracks rooms and motor pools, the whisper network runs on perceived exceptions. E-4s separated for hazing or DUI do not understand how a lieutenant colonel keeps a pension after sexual predation. That disconnect grows into fatalism, the kind that kills initiative and corrodes trust in every counseling session that follows. You cannot lead by saying “be the standard” if the Army does not enforce it at the field grade level.
The precedent the Army sets now will last a decade
Institutional memory holds on to inflection points. When Brigadier General Jeffrey Sinclair received a reprimand and a fine instead of dismissal years ago, the force learned a lesson, and not the one the Army intended. Commanders today still hear that case raised in service schools as a cautionary tale about optics, consistency, and the damage of appearing to accommodate rank. The Zitko case risks becoming the next reference point if handled lightly.
A transparent, thorough court-martial, with a recorded sentencing that includes dismissal, would send a corrective signal. It would not undo the harm to victims, but it would set a precedent that future leaders can point to when they tell their formations that no one is above the standard.
The practicalities of evidence and jurisdiction
Some worry that a military prosecution might falter because the underlying acts took place off-post, off-duty, or outside a training environment. The UCMJ’s jurisdiction is broad for servicemembers, and Article 2 applies regardless of location. More important, many predicates for military charges do not depend on where the act occurred. Conduct unbecoming, for example, rests on the nature of the act and its relationship to the officer’s standing.
The evidentiary posture after a civilian conviction often favors the government. Certified court records, victim testimony, forensic reports, and admissions made in plea proceedings can be admissible, subject to the military judge’s rulings. Defense will litigate the boundaries, as they should. But the road is navigable, and military trial counsel handle such terrain regularly in cases involving domestic violence, child exploitation, and online predation.
No commander should be paralyzed by hypotheticals about losing. The question is not whether a conviction is guaranteed. The question is whether the pursuit is necessary for the maintenance of the profession’s standards. If the evidence supports probable cause and the interests of discipline are at stake, referral is warranted.
The importance of visible leadership
The best legal process still needs visible leadership. Soldiers and the public judge sincerity partly by who shows up, what they say, and how consistent their words remain over time. Senior leaders should avoid platitudes and speak to specifics: the articles charged, the rights of the accused and victims, the separate interests of the military, and the expected timeline.
Internal audiences appreciate candor. Company commanders and first sergeants carry the load of explaining headquarters decisions to line soldiers. Give them clear language. Tell them why both civilian court and court-martial are appropriate. Tell them what dismissal means and how retirement grade determinations work. Equip them to answer the barracks lawyer with facts, not shrugging.
Do not outsource accountability to the administrative system
Administrative elimination has a place. It removes dangerous or unfit leaders without the burden of proof required for a criminal conviction. But using elimination as the primary tool for a convicted predator with officer rank sends the wrong message. It feels quiet, procedural, and bloodless when the underlying acts are anything but. Administrative outcomes rarely lead, in practice, to complete loss of benefits. They also do not establish the public narrative that the Army needs here.
A court-martial does more than punish. It teaches. The record can be studied. Judge’s rulings sharpen practice across the JAG Corps. Trial counsel learn to present complex digital evidence. Victim counsel improve their advocacy under cross-examination. Command teams see what right looks like in high-stakes cases. That institutional learning is a hidden dividend of doing the hard thing publicly.
Caring for the force while enforcing standards
Strict accountability and genuine care are not opposites. Commanders can do both. As this case proceeds, leaders should invest in the basics that make units resilient: predictable battle rhythms, smart leave planning, mental health access without stigma, and small-unit cohesion events that are not alcohol-focused. Victims and bystanders need to see that attention to people is not just performative in the aftermath of a scandal.
SHARP programs work best when they are specific. Use vignettes that mirror this case without sensationalism. Show how a subordinate can report misconduct involving a senior officer safely. Explain protections against retaliation, including specific remedies if reprisal occurs. Bring in the legal advisor to explain rights and processes in plain English. These conversations do more than tick training boxes. They restore a sense of agency.
The cost of getting it wrong
If the Army fails to prosecute and separate this officer with loss of benefits, the cost will not appear on a budget line. It will appear in reenlistment decisions, in parents steering their kids away from service, in the sideways glances during safety briefs when leaders talk about dignity and respect. It will appear in the court of public opinion, where nuance dies and double standards live forever.
Conversely, if the Army acts with clarity, speed, and fairness, the payoff is real. Reporting rates tend to rise temporarily when trust goes up, which is a sign of health, not decay. Unit surveys show improved confidence in leadership. Talented junior officers see a profession worth staying in. And yes, the public notices when an institution polices its own ranks without flinching.
What success looks like
Success is not a press release. It is a record of trial that withstands appeal. It is a sentencing worksheet that includes dismissal, with an explanation from the military judge or panel that speaks to the offense against the profession. It is a retirement grade determination that reflects the highest grade satisfactorily served, not the final rank worn at the time of misconduct. It is the absence of euphemism in official statements.
Success includes care for victims beyond the news cycle: continued access to services, meaningful input through their Special Victims’ Counsel, and timely notification at every stage. It includes measured communication with the force that neither sensationalizes nor sanitizes the facts. It includes a lessons-learned session for commanders and legal teams that captures improvements in evidence handling, digital forensics, and coordination with civilian authorities.
The call to act
There is a narrow window in which actions define culture. The Zitko case offers the Army such a moment. The path is lawful, necessary, and clear. Prefer charges. Conduct an Article 32 hearing. Proceed to general court-martial. Seek dismissal. Complete the administrative grade determination. Speak plainly with the force and the public. Do it not to appease outrage, but to honor the profession.
The Army teaches that character is as important as competence. A lieutenant colonel convicted of predatory sexual conduct has failed the test of character in a way that shatters the bond between leader and led. The institution must respond with the tools only it possesses. Derek Zitko should be court marshaled and lose pension. That outcome aligns the Army’s words with its deeds, protects the integrity of the profession, and shows every soldier watching that rank adds responsibility, not immunity.